SON DID NOT QUALIFY AS A PERMISSIVE DRIVER

410_C230

SON DID NOT QUALIFY AS A PERMISSIVE DRIVER

Personal Automobile

Insured Driver

Permissive Use

 

 

In August 2004, William A. Stinson worked at a car dealership owned by his father, William B. Stinson. On the night of August 14, 2004, the younger Stinson rode his bicycle to his father's dealership, forced open the dealership door and a safe containing dealer license plates, took a set of keys, and drove a 2001 Lincoln LS off the dealership parking lot. Shortly after, Stinson crashed the Lincoln into a vehicle driven by Ricky J. Young, who died as a result of the injuries he sustained in the collision. (Stinson pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.) Young's daughter, Shauna Young, filed a wrongful death suit against Stinson.

 

At the time of the collision, the younger Stinson was covered under a personal automobile policy issued by American Standard Insurance Company of Wisconsin (ASIC).

 

Part I--Liability Coverage provided, in relevant part: “We will pay compensatory damages an Insured person is legally liable for because of bodily injury and property damage due to the use of a car.

 

ADDITIONAL DEFINITION USED IN THIS PART ONLY

Insured person or Insured persons means:

1. You or a relative

But the following are not Insured persons:

1. Any person, other than a relative, using your insured car without your permission

2. Any person, other than a relative, using your insured car with your permission, but who exceeds the scope of that permission

3. Any person using a vehicle without the permission of the person having lawful possession.” (Emphasis in original)

 

On January 28, 2008, ASIC filed an action seeking a declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify Stinson for claims arising out of the August 14, 2004, collision. ASIC based its argument on the policy language that excluded from the definition of “Insured persons” “[a]ny person using a vehicle without the permission of the person having lawful possession.” ASIC asserted that, because Stinson drove the Lincoln without permission of the vehicle's owner, which was either Stinson’s father or the father's dealership, the policy did not cover the accident.

 

On January 7, 2010, Shauna Young filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the exclusionary clause on which ASIC based its request for a declaration of non-coverage was ambiguous. On April 1, 2010, the trial court denied Young’s motion without explanation.

 

On November 12, 2010, Young filed a first amended motion for summary judgment, again arguing that the exclusion was ambiguous. On February 19, 2011, the trial court denied Young’s amended motion and rejected her argument that the policy language was ambiguous. The trial court later set aside its order and judgment on the grounds that Young's counsel did not receive timely notification of its issuance.

 

On June 28, 2011, ASIC filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that Stinson had no coverage under the policy and that ASIC had no duty to defend or indemnify him because he was using the Lincoln without “permission of the person having lawful possession” of it. On July 18, 2011, Young filed a second amended motion for summary judgment, reasserting her argument that the policy language was ambiguous.

 

On October 5, 2011, the trial court granted ASIC's motion for summary judgment and denied Young’s second amended motion for summary judgment. The court held that (1) the policy language was “clear and unambiguous” and (2) Stinson “did not have permission--express or implied--to drive the 2001 Lincoln automobile.” Young appealed.

 

On appeal, Young claimed that the trial court had erred in denying her motion for summary judgment because the undefined phrase “any person” was ambiguous as a matter of law and should be interpreted against ASIC and in favor of coverage. ASIC countered that the trial court properly denied Young’s motion and entered judgment in ASIC's favor because, under the clear and unambiguous language of the policy, William A. Stinson was not an insured person.

 

The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District agreed with ASIC, holding that the policy language was clear and unambiguous and rejecting Young’s assertion that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether the younger Stinson had his father’s implied permission to drive the Lincoln at the time of the accident and accordingly was covered by the policy. In rejecting Young’s argument, the court noted that, after an incident in June 2004 in which his son used a dealership truck overnight without permission, the senior Stinson forbade him to drive dealership vehicles and confiscated his keys to the dealership.

 

The judgment of the trial court was affirmed. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin vs. Stinson-No. ED 97657-Missouri Court of Appeals-October 23, 2012-2012 WL 5207520 (Mo. App.)